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ARTICLE
“THE NATURAL RIGHT TO PROPERTY AND
THE IMPOSSIBILITY OF OWNING THE
INTANGIBLE: A TENSION IN
CATHOLIC THOUGHT”1
PAUL J. GRIFFITHS,
WARREN CHAIR OF CATHOLIC THEOLOGY
AT DUKE DIVINITY SCHOOL
I. PROPERTY & OWNERSHIP
Following the deep structure of standard early modern accounts of
ownership and property,2 I’ll take “ownership” to be a relation borne by a
person3 to an object or an ensemble of objects. Such objects and ensembles
might be animate or inanimate. The relation in question is, ideally, one of
untrammeled right to sequester. To sequester is to remove what is to be
sequestered from the public sphere to the private by exercising control over
access, use, and disposal; on this understanding, the perfectly sequestered
object is a thing to which only the owner has access, which only the owner
can use, and which only the owner can dispose of—which is to say take out
of existence—as and when the owner chooses. The right to sequester is
1. An early version of this essay was delivered orally at a symposium on intellectual
property at the University of St. Thomas School of Law in Minneapolis on April 5, 2013. I am
grateful for the discussion it received then, and for the improvements I have been able to make as
a result. I am grateful, too, to Tom Berg for the invitation to participate in the event.
2. See, e.g., JOHN LOCKE, TWO TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT 193–214 (Peter Laslett ed.,
Cambridge Univ. Press 1960) (1690). Compare JEREMY WALDRON, THE RIGHT TO PRIVATE PROP-
ERTY 137–252 (1988) (discussing a classic analysis and critique of Locke’s theory of property),
with JEDEDIAH PURDY, THE MEANING OF PROPERTY: FREEDOM, COMMUNITY, AND THE LEGAL
IMAGINATION 40–43 (2010) (providing further analysis of Locke’s theory of property).
3. “Person” may refer to individual human persons, or to any corporate or collective body
by extension so designated. There are deep difficulties here, but since it has for a long time been
established in law and ordinary political practice that there are corporate persons, and since there
is precedent in theology and canon law for this view, I will not make any distinction between
individual and corporate persons in what follows. It should be borne in mind, though, that the
fundamental sense of persona for the Catholic intellectual tradition is theological: the sanctissima
trinitas is comprised of three persons, and Jesus Christ is a person with two natures. These are the
senses of persona in which all others participate and from which all others are derived.
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untrammeled when it is unconstrained by agents or states of affairs external
to the owner and the thing owned—anything other than the devices and
desires of the owner and the properties of the object. To establish these
relations with something intangible is to become the owner of a piece of
intellectual property. In what follows I will trace what I take to be the Cath-
olic tradition’s main positions, positive and negative, on the ownership of
tangibles in order to articulate, mostly by deduction, a Catholic perspective
on the ownership of intangibles. The first will show how the properly
“fallen” character of any ownership is based on the scriptural account of
creation wherein the original harmony of creation becomes disordered as a
result of humanity’s sin. Even the positive view of ownership is necessarily
predicated on this view of a devastated status—of man and earth at present.
Augustine’s distinction between private and public will help us consider
further the proper lines of reasoning about ownership of things tangible
(sensibilia) and intangible (intelligibilia). Finally, I will suggest that
Catholics must deal honestly with the ambivalence within our tradition on
these matters while resisting prescribed responses or resolutions that may
fail to recognize other viable alternatives to either the extension or restric-
tion of intellectual property rights.
It is easy enough to see how I might have a relation of ownership to a
tangible thing, a thing that takes up space in the world. For example, were I
to own Caravaggio’s painting Madonna dei Palafrenieri, I would be able to
make it unavailable for viewing to anyone other than myself. I could deter-
mine without consultation or constraint how it may be used and decide
whether and under what circumstances to remove it from existence. It is
less easy to see how it is possible to own something intangible in this way.
There are puzzles about access and disposal in the case of intangibles,
though fewer about use. It is not easy to know how to take an intangible out
of existence or what it would mean to do so. For example, is it possible to
destroy a word-sequence in English, a mathematical proof, a pattern of
sounds, or a color-shade? And, because intangibles are types with infinitely
many tangible tokens, it is difficult to know what control of access by se-
questration means. What might it mean to sequester a particular shade of
orange so that only its owner has access to it? There are perhaps ways of
answering these questions, but it is not obvious what they are. Therefore,
analyses of what it means to own a piece of intellectual property—an intan-
gible—are opaque to begin with, even if not opaque beyond possibility of
clarification.
The account of ownership offered above is not precisely reflected in
any code of positive law. I own nothing in exactly this sense according to
the law of the State of North Carolina, where I live, or according to that of
the federal government of the United States. There are always external con-
straints and restraints of one kind or another upon my right and capacity to
sequester the things I am by courtesy said to own. Nonetheless, it is this
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right that essentially constitutes ownership according to standard early mod-
ern accounts. The degree to which it is present and untrammeled in particu-
lar cases is the degree to which persons approach the condition of being
property owners. In life—life in the devastated world we live in—owner-
ship is always a matter of degree. Thus, the ideal type of ownership I have
sketched is principally a tool for analytical purposes.
The Catholic intellectual tradition exhibits a profound ambivalence
about creaturely ownership in general and creaturely ownership of in-
tangibles in particular. I mean “ambivalence” in the strict and proper sense:
there are elements in the tradition that speak strongly for the desirability of
creaturely ownership and elements that speak strongly against it. First, I
will treat the most significant threads in the tradition that speak against it
and then those that speak for it.
II. CONTRA CREATURELY OWNERSHIP OF TANGIBLES
According to the account of ownership I have just given, there is one
ideal owner, one who occupies the position of owner in relation to every
particular thing other than himself. That owner is the LORD, the God of
Israel, who became incarnate as Jesus Christ and whose bride is the
Church.4 Indeed, the account of ownership given is derived exactly from an
understanding of the relation the LORD bears to all creatures. He brought
all creatures into being ex nihilo—out of nothing—and without constraint
by anything external to himself, can sequester any one of them, or all of
them together, without impediment.5 Ownership, in its pure form, belongs
to the LORD. It can be replicated by creatures, to whatever limited extent
that is possible, only by participation in and imitation of the LORD’s own-
ership of his creatures; by derivation this means imperfectly and with the
sanction of short-lived earthly laws that grant nothing beyond what they
immediately legislate.6
4. The Catholic Church, together with most Christians, understands God as three persons
(Father, Son, and Spirit) in one substance. See AUGUSTINE, THE TRINITY 175–241 (Stephen McK-
enna trans., Catholic Univ. of Am. Press 1963) (providing a classic exposition of the meaning and
conceptual structure of this view).
5. For the scriptural creation accounts, see Genesis 1–3 and the recapitulation in John
1:1–14.
6. Variations on these points are everywhere in the Christian tradition. Consider the follow-
ing (perhaps over-excited) example: “Vnde quisque possidet quod possidet ? nonne iure humano ?
Nam iure diuino, Domini est terra et plenitudo eius [Psalm 23:1]; pauperes et diuites Deus de
uno limo fecit, et pauperes et diuites una terra supportat. Iure tamen humano dicit : Haec uilla
mea est, haec domus mea, hic seruus meus est. Iure ergo humano, iure imperatorum. Quare ?
Quia ipsa iura humana per imperatores et reges saeculi Deus distribuit generi humano. Vultis
legamus leges imperatorum, et secundum ipsas agamus de uillis ? Si iure humano uultis pos-
sidere, recitemus leges imperatorum ; uideamus si uoluerunt aliquid ab haereticis possideri. Sed
quid mihi est imperator ? Secundum ius ipsius possides terram. Aut tolle iura imperatorum, et
quis audet dicere : Mea est illa uilla, aut meus est ille seruus, aut domus haec mea est ??”
AUGUSTINE, TRACTATUS IN IOHANNIS EVANGELIUM CXXIV 66 (Radbobus Willems ed., Ty-
pographi Brepols 1954); see PETER BROWN, THROUGH THE EYE OF A NEEDLE: WEALTH, THE FALL
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Creaturely ownership is thus dependent in the order of being upon di-
vine ownership, just as any account of creaturely ownership capable of be-
ing offered in the conceptual order is parasitic upon an account of divine
ownership. These are fundamental features of the Catholic intellectual tradi-
tion’s treatment of property and ownership.7 They provide some difficulties
and account for some of the ambivalence within the Catholic tradition about
creaturely property and ownership. If ownership in its strict and proper
sense is a divine prerogative, then to what extent should human creatures
seek to imitate and participate in it? What should an account of creaturely
ownership look like given that creatures lack all the powers and capacities
that make it possible for the LORD to own? Might it not be better simply to
deny that creatures can own property as a way of marking the distinction
between creatures and the LORD—which is the fundamental distinction in
Catholic thought? And even if this route is not taken, as it certainly has not
been by the mainstream Catholic tradition, the primacy of the LORD’s
ownership, together with its predication upon the distinction between the
LORD and creatures, means that affirmations of creaturely ownership are
always and necessarily elaborated by the tradition with reserve—theologi-
cal reserve, we might say.
A second thread in the fabric of what we might call Catholic anti-
ownership thought is the standard view that there was no ownership in
Eden. This is close to commonplace among the fathers of the Church and is
therefore present as well in the high-medieval tradition8 and in the broadly
magisterial tradition: creaturely approximations of ownership—deeply im-
perfect simulacra of the LORD’s relationship to creatures as they must al-
OF ROME, AND THE MAKING OF CHRISTIANITY IN THE WEST, 350–550 AD 148–84 (2012) (provid-
ing an excellent recent study of Augustine on wealth and property).
7. See  Leo XIII, Rerum Novarum [Encyclical Letter on Capital and Labor] ¶¶ 4–57 (1891),
available at http://www.vatican.va/holy_father/leo_xiii/encyclicals/documents/hf_l-xiii_enc_
15051891_rerum-novarum_en.html; Pius XI, Quadragesimo Anno [Encyclical Letter on Recon-
struction of the Social Order] ¶¶ 44–131 (1931), available at http://www.vatican.va/holy_father/
pius_xi/encyclicals/documents/hf_p-xi_enc_19310515_quadragesimo-anno_en.html; Paul VI,
Populorum Progressio [Encyclical Letter on the Development of Peoples] ¶ 23 (1967), available
at  http://www.vatican.va/holy_father/paul_vi/encyclicals/documents/hf_p-vi_enc_26031967_
populorum_en.html; John Paul II, Centesimus Annus [Encyclical Letter on the Hundreth Anniver-
sary of Rerum Novarum] ¶¶ 30–43 (1991), available at http://www.vatican.va/holy_father/john_
paul_ii/encyclicals/documents/hf_jp-ii_enc_01051991_centesimus-annus_en.html; Benedict XVI,
Caritas in Veritate [Encyclical Letter on Integral Human Development in Charity and Truth] ¶ 22
(2009), available at http://www.vatican.va/holy_father/benedict_xvi/encyclicals/documents/hf_
ben-xvi_enc_20090629_caritas-in-veritate_en.html (providing doctrinal formulations of this un-
derstanding of property and ownership).
8. See BONIFACE RAMSEY O.P., AMBROSE 117–44 (Carol Harrison ed., 1997) (providing a
patristic example). Compare THOMAS AQUINAS, COMMENTARY ON THE SENTENCES 4.33.2.2
(1858), available at http://www.corpusthomisticum.org/snp4027.html#20008, with 38 THOMAS
AQUINAS, SUMMA THEOLOGIAE: INJUSTICE 64–69 (Marcus Lefebure trans., 1975) (providing
Thomas Aquinas’ views on individual ownership).
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ways be—are, without exception, a result of the fall.9 This means that
ownership is an accommodation to disaster, to the primordial cataclysm of
the fall. Absent the fall, there could be no competition for resources, no
necessity for property to support life and human flourishing, no tendency on
the part of one creature to attempt expropriation of the goods of another and
therefore no need for the sequestration that belongs to ownership.
And similarly for heaven: ownership is absent there because the needs
of all creatures are fully met without ownership. This is clear from the
mainstream tradition’s assumption that any creatures there might be in
heaven, animate or inanimate, are not capable of being owned. Even were
there some creatures in heaven capable of being owned—inanimate objects
of a small size, for instance (a position sometimes entertained on the mar-
gins of orthodoxy)—there could be no need for rational creatures like us or
the angels to own them, for in heaven there are no material or other needs
that could require or make sense of such ownership.
These thought-experiments about Eden and heaven are standard in the
Catholic tradition. Their purpose is to distinguish what is an effect of the
fall from what belongs properly to undamaged human beings severally and
collectively. Ownership belongs clearly to the former category. That it does
explains why, with a remarkable degree of consistency, the Catholic tradi-
tion has regarded lives lived in poverty on earth—which is to say, without
ownership—as superior to lives lived entangled by the sequestration of in-
animate corporeal goods. A life without ownership is better than a life with
it, in something like the same way that the celibate life is better than the
sexually active life.10 The Catholic tradition has consistently asserted this
belief. This judgment is reflected in the intimacy with which poverty and
celibacy are linked in the long Western tradition. Most religious orders re-
quire their vowed members to bind themselves to both, and the connections
between them are sufficiently obvious that they need little comment. An
important distinction between them, however, is that the Church has never
sanctified and sacramentalized property ownership as it has sex. There is
nothing like the sacrament of marriage to bind owners to their property as
spouses are bound to one another, and therefore the elevation of the life of
poverty above that of ownership is less nuanced than that of the celibate life
above the sexually active one. To put the same point differently: the goods
9. “The fall” refers to that moment in the narrative of Genesis chapter 3 when the original
harmony of creation becomes disordered through Adam and Eve’s disobedience to God. The
dominion granted to humanity in the state of original justice entails a responsibility toward crea-
tion as expressed in the account of Adam’s naming other creaturely life. Genesis 2:19–20. The
broken order of relationality between God and humanity, and humanity and the rest of creation—
occasioned by humanity’s first act of disobedience—may be indexed to humanity’s wrongful
desire to own that which properly belongs to God. Thus, ownership becomes the expression of
humanity’s abuse of original freedom which is itself gifted.
10. See generally AUGUSTINE, MARRIAGE AND VIRGINITY 68–107 (John E. Rotelle & David
G. Hunter eds., Ray Kearney trans., 1999) (providing his treatise “Holy Virginity”).
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present in property ownership are of lesser significance for the Catholic
tradition than those present in married sex, even though the renunciation of
the one typically accompanies the renunciation of the other.
There is dominical insistence upon the value of renouncing property as
well. The rich man who comes to Jesus and asks what he must do to inherit
eternal life is told that since he already keeps the commandments he lacks
only one thing, which is to sell what he has and give the proceeds to the
poor.11 Then, Jesus says, he will have treasure in heaven.12 The young man
cannot do this, and his incapacity prompts Jesus to emphasize how difficult
it is for those who own much to enter the kingdom of heaven.13 This epi-
sode serves as the paradigmatic, though by no means the only, scriptural
basis for the Catholic tradition’s elevation of poverty over the propertied
life. It has been among the principal scriptural texts appealed to as encour-
agement and support for forms of life, both solitary and social, that attempt
to do altogether without property. The Catholic tradition has been marked at
various times by large-scale attempts to give institutional form to a life
without property owned by individuals—and, sometimes, without owner-
ship understood as untrammeled sequestration at all. The complex history
of the foundation and reform of the Church’s religious orders circles around
this question.
All this is about ownership of corporeal goods—land, money, and
portable property of various kinds. It is not about ownership of intangibles.
Different things have to be said about that, which I’ll come to in a moment.
It is important to bear in mind at this stage that the theological reserve about
creaturely ownership of property I have identified carries with it the eleva-
tion of poverty over property ownership and does so because the latter is a
feature of the fall. It is not proper to human creatures as such. It is in this
context that the positive things the tradition has to say about ownership
must be placed. To forget this is to forget something of fundamental
importance.
III. CONTRA CREATURELY OWNERSHIP OF INTANGIBLES
Questions about whether it is possible to own intangibles, and if so
under what conditions and for what purposes, are much less prominent in
the Catholic intellectual tradition than are questions about ownership of
tangibles. That is not surprising. Neither Roman law nor canon law has
much to say about intangibles, while both have a lot to say about tangibles.
Theologians and canonists, therefore, have rarely addressed the topic di-
rectly. But they have done so indirectly, mostly by way of thought about
what belongs to the public sphere and what to the private, and about the
11. See Matthew 19:16–30; Mark 10:17–22; Luke 18:18–30.
12. Id.
13. Id.
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nature of each. The remarks that follow are based mostly on Augustine’s
version of this pattern of thought; because of the depth of his influence on
the Latin West, he can reasonably be taken as representative on this ques-
tion. Further, the pattern of thought he provides does have direct relevance
to the question of owning intangibles.
We can begin with a representative quotation, and then very briefly
trace its implications:14
[W]hat is proper [proprium] and in a sense private [quasi
privatum], should be understood as what belongs to each one of
us alone; it is experienced by each one alone in himself as belong-
ing properly to his own nature. By contrast, what is common
[commune] is in a sense public [quasi publicum], and is exper-
ienced by all those who experience, without change or
corruption.15
Augustine here distinguishes what is proper and private from what is
public and held in common. He first makes the distinction in terms of own-
ership: if something is private, you alone hold it, whereas if something is
public, it is freely available to all. The second facet of the distinction has to
do with knowing: a privately held thing can be known only by its owner,
whereas a public thing is known by all. For Augustine, the distinction is not
only descriptive but also normative: truly public things are not subject to
change or corruption, while all private things are inevitably corrupted
merely by being privately held. The normative part of the distinction holds,
because public things have not been forcibly sequestered from their proper
participation in the LORD, while private things have been so sequestered
and have thereby been corrupted.
Augustine assumes an ontology here. It is one whose essential distinc-
tion is between intelligibilia on the one hand, which are noncorporeal,
changeless, and without beginning or end; and sensibilia on the other hand,
which are located in time and extended in space. The easiest examples of
intelligibilia—things that can be objects of the intellect—are mathematical:
numbers and all their relations. These, if they exist,16 are beyond the reach
of time and change. The same can be said, thinks Augustine and the vast
majority of the Catholic tradition (we are all good Platonists about this), of
everything that can be known—which is just what the word intelligibilia
means. Objects of sense, sensibilia, are those things located in space-time
and, thus, apprehensible by one or another of (or some combination of) our
senses. This ontology is of course debatable, but it is fundamental to the
14. PAUL J. GRIFFITHS, INTELLECTUAL APPETITE: A THEOLOGICAL GRAMMAR 139 (2009).
15. Id. “Proprium ergo et quasi privatum intellegendum est, quod unus quisque nostrum sibi
est, et quod in se solus sentit, quod ad suam naturam proprie pertinet: commune autem et quasi
publicum, quod ab omnibus sentientibus nulla sui corruptione atque commutatione sentitur.” Id.
16. Not everyone—not all mathematicians, even—thinks that there are such things as num-
bers. It is possible to be a nominalist about these things, though I doubt that Christians can be.
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Catholic intellectual tradition. To abandon it would be close to abandoning
the tradition altogether.
Augustine connects this ontology to a thesis about ownership. Intel-
ligibles belong to the public sphere, to the commons, as Augustine explic-
itly says in the quotation given above. Such things cannot be sequestered in
any real sense. For instance, if I know the proof of Goldbach’s Conjec-
ture—that every even number greater than two can be expressed as the sum
of two primes (I do not)—then the content of my knowledge is in principle
incapable of sequestration. Its mode of being is definitively public. To at-
tempt sequestration of it would be to treat it as if it were sensible, as if I
could lock it up in a room and control access to it. Attempts to do this,
Augustine thinks, are evidence of a disordered appetite for knowledge,17 an
appetite that wants not merely to know but also to own what is known, to
act toward it as only the LORD can act—for he, of course, has exhaustive
knowledge of all intelligibles and contemplates them totum simul, all at
once.18 But short of this, to attempt sequestration, which is essential to own-
ership, of an intelligible is to attempt a performatively incoherent act, rather
as if one were to assert the impossibility of assertion or to eat like a sumo
wrestler with the idea of becoming a jockey.
This position on the ownership of intangibles, scarcely more than
sketched here, is more radical than the critique of the ownership of
tangibles set forth in part two. It sees the attempt to sequester and control
intelligibilia as in principle impossible, a performatively incoherent act that
damages those who attempt it by altering their relations to what it is they
hope to know. Those who try to own intelligibles, on a broadly Augustinian
view, are attempting to consume and make their own what they would be
better off contemplating.19
There is a question about the degree of overlap between the kinds of
things that Augustine calls intelligibilia and the kinds of things that can be
owned under the rubric of intellectual property in American positive law.
The two categories are not identical, but in my estimation there is signifi-
cant overlap between what is covered by each. Consider the example of a
particular ensemble of words, such as those found in this essay. According
to our current legal habits, such an ensemble can be copyrighted, which
17. Augustine standardly distinguishes studiositas, the well-formed and virtuous appetite for
knowledge, from curiositas, its ill-formed and vicious opposite number. See generally JOSEPH
TORCHIA, RESTLESS MIND: CURIOSITAS & THE SCOPE OF INQUIRY IN ST. AUGUSTINE’S PSYCHOL-
OGY (2013) (providing a detailed study of Augustine’s views on the topic).
18. See generally 1 THOMAS AQUINAS, SUMMA THEOLOGIAE: THEOLOGY 4–9 (Thomas Gilby
trans., 1964) (discussing the LORD’s omniscience); 4 THOMAS AQUINAS, SUMMA THEOLOGIAE:
KNOWLEDGE IN GOD 2–61 (Thomas Gornall trans., 1964) (discussing the LORD’s omniscience).
19. Simone Weil’s formulation underlies this sentence: “It may be that vice, depravity and
crime are nearly always . . .  in their essence, attempts to eat beauty, to eat what we should only
look at.” SIMONE WEIL, WAITING FOR GOD 166 (Leslie A. Fiedler ed., Emma Craufurd trans.,
1951).
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means that the copyright holder has rights over the use of any instance of
the ensemble. This is close to what I mean by a right to sequestration. Au-
gustine would say that what the word-ensemble expresses is—if true—a
feature of the world, a state of affairs that comes under the heading of intel-
ligibilia. To attempt sequestration of the words that express it is exactly to
attempt privatization-by-control of something that by definition cannot be
so controlled. Therefore, the Augustinian position, which is also the broadly
Catholic position, has at least some purchase on the question about owning
intangibles.
IV. PRO CREATURELY OWNERSHIP: A NATURAL RIGHT?
So far we have before us an ambivalence about creaturely ownership
of sensibilia and a principled rejection of creaturely ownership of intel-
ligibilia, all of which are intangibles. Both are deeply characteristic of the
Catholic intellectual tradition; a strong affirmation of something like a natu-
ral right to the ownership of property, however, is also deeply characteristic
of the tradition, at least with respect to tangibles. How can this be? How is
it possible for the tradition to generate such a tension?
The Catholic tradition’s strong affirmation of a right to ownership is
evident from at least the fourth century on.20 Accounts of what it is to own,
and why there is a right to do so, reached a high point of sophistication and
precision in the thirteenth century debates following the Franciscan reforms
and began to be enshrined in the magisterial tradition at that time.21 Later,
in the nineteenth century, in part as a response to broadly Marxist critiques
of the idea of private property (and indeed of ownership of any kind), the
magisterium returned to this topic and again affirmed the right to own prop-
erty as a natural right that belongs to the nature of human persons on earth.
This is clear, for example, in Pope Leo XIII’s encyclical of 1891, Rerum
Novarum, and it has become a standard item in Catholic social teaching
since then.22 There are two essential points to keep in mind about this affir-
mation of a natural right to property ownership.
20. See supra text accompanying notes 14–19.
21. See generally Giorgio Agamben, ALTISSIMA POVERT `A: REGOLE MONASTICHE E FORMA DI
VITA (Neri Pozza ed., 2011) (discussing the debates about property and ownership following the
Franciscan reforms).
22. The formulation is: “For, every man has by nature the right to possess property as his
own. This is one of the chief points of distinction between man and the animal creation, for the
brute has no power of self direction [sic], but is governed by two main instincts, which keep his
powers on the alert, impel him to develop them in a fitting manner, and stimulate and determine
him to action without any power of choice. One of these instincts is self preservation [sic], the
other the propagation of the species. Both can attain their purpose by means of things which lie
within range; beyond their verge the brute creation cannot go, for they are moved to action by
their senses only, and in the special direction which these suggest. But with man it is wholly
different. He possesses, on the one hand, the full perfection of the animal being, and hence enjoys
at least as much as the rest of the animal kind, the fruition of things material. But animal nature,
however perfect, is far from representing the human being in its completeness, and is in truth but
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The first is that it is a right accommodated to the conditions of a dam-
aged cosmos and a damaged social order. The right does not belong to
human nature as such. It belongs only to human nature as fallen, as is evi-
dent from the thought-experiments mentioned in part two regarding the ab-
sence of property in Eden and heaven. When things are as they should be
there will not be property. Therefore, the natural right in question has the
form of a conditional: if the social and material orders have become chaoti-
cally violent and competitive, and if individual human persons have simi-
larly become concupiscently aggressive, then property is essential as one
among many means of constraining further damage. That is what the natu-
ral right to ownership means. In this case, the conditional’s antecedent is
affirmed; there has in fact been damage of this sort, so the right obtains.
However, the right is temporary: it does not belong to the proper end of
human persons.23 Given this proviso, however, the right is genuine and
deep. Without it, human persons and the human social order cannot flourish
here below.
The second essential point in regard to the Catholic tradition’s affirma-
tion of a natural right to property ownership is that the right to property is—
usually24—predicated on a particular understanding of what it means to
own something significantly at odds with the early modern standard view
with which I began this article. Ownership must indeed include sequestra-
tion for use, but it also necessarily includes consideration of what we se-
quester for our use “as common in the sense that [the goods we own] should
be able to benefit not only [us] but also others.”25 This notion of the com-
monality of property is intrinsic to the tradition’s treatment of it. It means
that sequestration is always and necessarily ordered by, and to, a considera-
tion of the nature of what is sequestered; the sequestered is good only if it
humanity’s humble handmaid, made to serve and to obey. It is the mind, or reason, which is the
predominant element in us who are human creatures; it is this which renders a human being
human, and distinguishes him essentially from the brute. And on this very account—that man
alone among the animal creation is endowed with reason—it must be within his right to possess
things not merely for temporary and momentary use, as other living things do, but to have and to
hold them in stable and permanent possession; he must have not only things that perish in the use,
but those also which, though they have been reduced into use, continue for further use in after
time.” Leo XIII, supra note 7, at ¶ 6. This theme has been taken up and elaborated in virtually all
the magisterial documents of Catholic Social teaching since. See, e.g., John Paul II, Laborem
Exercens [Encyclical Letter on Human Work] § 14 (1981), available at http://www.vatican.va/
holy_father/john_paul_ii/encyclicals/documents/hf_jp-ii_enc_14091981_laborem-exercens_en.
html.
23. Thomas Aquinas tends to locate the right to property ownership in the ius gentium rather
than in the ius naturale, though there are complications here. See 28 THOMAS AQUINAS, SUMMA
THEOLOGIAE: LAW 90–95, 111–17 (Thomas Gilby trans., 1966); see generally 38 THOMAS AQUI-
NAS, SUMMA THEOLOGIAE: INJUSTICE 69 (Marcus Lefebure trans., 1975).
24. The tradition is not of one voice on this matter, but the majority position—and certainly
the authoritative magisterial position—is as I will go on to describe.
25. Pope Paul VI, Gaudium et Spes [Pastoral Constitution on the Church in the Modern
World] ¶ 69 (1965), available at http://www.vatican.va/archive/hist_councils/ii_vatican_council/
documents/vat-ii_cons_19651207_gaudium-et-spes_en.html.
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benefits its owner as well as the whole. To return to the quotation from
Augustine given in part three, even material goods sequestered for owner-
ship remain, in a sense, public goods—common goods for the benefit of all.
To understand owned goods differently would be to misunderstand them.
V. A CATHOLIC WAY FORWARD?
What does all this yield for a properly Catholic understanding of the
ownership of intangibles?
First, there are deep difficulties in giving a coherent account of what it
means to own an intangible. Second, providing a system of positive law so
that ownership of intangibles is made possible in some sense is a necessary
accommodation to the fall and therefore something to be lamented. Third,
even when such a system of positive law is in place—as it is for us—
sequestration of intangibles by individuals or corporations must be under-
stood to have the common good as an essential element in it. Fourth, be-
cause of the special difficulties for Catholics in accounting for the
ownership of intangibles and in working within a legal system that provides
for such, we Catholics should actively seek other legal means of providing
for the goods that intellectual-property law supports. Among those goods is
the thought that the social and political orders must find ways to support
intellectual and artistic work in a violent and degraded world of short com-
mons in which such work and those who do it are otherwise likely to get
short shrift.
We Catholics are not utopian in our approach to positive law or polit-
ics. There is no immediate prospect that positive law governing the owner-
ship of intangibles will wither away, and there are genuine goods that it
supports. Thus, we need not advocate revolution or disobedience—even
principled disobedience—to positive law about these matters already in
place. What we can and should do first is gain clarity about what the Catho-
lic tradition has to offer on these matters (what I have written here is no
more than a first step). Second, we should consider whether there are other
ways in which, in a devastated world such as this, the goods supported by
intellectual-property law might be nurtured. Third, if there are other ways
that are not subject to the kinds of critique just offered, we should advocate
them in principle and support instances of them when they appear and seem
practicable.
Are there other ways in which the good work done by intellectual-
property law might be undertaken? Certainly. There is a deep affinity be-
tween the Catholic tradition on property and the patronage system for the
support of those engaged in intellectual and artistic work. Virtually all artis-
tic work in Europe until the Reformation was supported by church pa-
tronage. Under that system, what is discovered or made by intellectual or
artistic workers (words, images, sounds, proofs, and so on) need not belong
2013] THE NATURAL RIGHT TO PROPERTY 601
to those who do the work to discover or make it. Rather, they are supported
by patrons in doing that work, and ideally what they make becomes part of
the commons. This was the usual way in which such workers were sup-
ported before the development of laws governing the principal forms of
intellectual property (copyright, patent, trademark, trade secret, and so on).
Those laws have an effective history of not much more than three centuries
and have had deep and wide reach for much less time than that.26 Yet such
work has been done for most of human history and has been supported in
other ways, mostly by patronage. Therefore, positive law that assumes the
possibility and propriety of the ownership of intangibles is not the only way
in which such work can be supported.
And not only this. The patronage system is not entirely dead even in
the United States. Those whose work has principally to do with intangibles
are often employed by universities, and it may be a condition of their em-
ployment that some among the fruits of their intellectual labors are not
owned by them, but rather by their employer. This is quite often the case,
for example, for curricular materials. Syllabi and other course-related
materials are often owned and at the disposal of the educational institutions
for which those who produce them work. In such cases (and there are simi-
lar instances in the for-profit corporate world), the patron is a corporate
body and the discoverer or producer of intangible goods the recipient of
corporate largesse. Admittedly, these instances do not altogether remove the
intangible goods in question from the economy of ownership: typically,
ownership is shifted from the corporate body to the individual. However,
they do provide examples of how someone might be supported in doing the
work she does without owning the results of her work.
Whether by individuals with resources to spare, for-profit corpora-
tions, or non-profit entities, moving patronage away from the economy of
ownership may provide a model for Catholics to support intellectual work
that is without some of the deep difficulties proper to the very idea of intel-
lectual property. Of course, patronage is not without its own problems, but
that is also true of all methods of supporting those whose work has to do
principally with intangibles.
The recovery of a property-free patronage system for intellectual work
is not the only thing we Catholics might advocate in this connection. When
we observe theorists or activists calling into question either the desirability
of intellectual property rights per se or the dramatic extension of those
rights currently under way in most of the world, we might treat them as
potential allies and examine closely whether what they argue or do can be
26. See generally JOSEPH LOEWENSTEIN, THE AUTHOR’S DUE: PRINTING AND THE PREHIS-
TORY OF COPYRIGHT (2002) (discussing an authoritative history of the early development of copy-
right law).
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actively supported by Catholics.27 After all, we live in a time of ferment
about the scope and bite of such things as copyright law. There are strong
pressures to strengthen and extend such laws, while at the same time there
are technological and theoretical solvents corroding the force of such laws.
Catholics who want to think about such things ought to support reductions
in the scope and force of such laws in general and do so in light of the
convictions we have about the importance of the commons and the firm
location—as a matter of principle—of intangible goods therein. We might
find allies in unexpected places in seeking these goals.
27. See generally GARY HALL, DIGITIZE THIS BOOK!: THE POLITICS OF NEW MEDIA, OR WHY
WE NEED OPEN ACCESS NOW (2008) (discussing a radical critique of intellectual property rights);
LAWRENCE LESSIG, FREE CULTURE: HOW BIG MEDIA USES TECHNOLOGY AND THE LAW TO LOCK
DOWN CULTURE AND CONTROL CREATIVITY (2004) (discussing a modern critique of intellectual
property rights); SIVA VAIDHYANATHAN, COPYRIGHTS AND COPYWRONGS: THE RISE OF INTELLEC-
TUAL PROPERTY AND HOW IT THREATENS CREATIVITY (2003) (discussing another modern critique
of intellectual property rights). For the work of activists, see the recent careers of Julian Assange
and Aaron Swartz. The latter’s suicide early in 2013 has made him a martyr in the eyes of some
opponents of intellectual property rights.
